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Abstract
Paid parking is the recommended policy tool to deal with cruising for street parking. In the
Netherlands, residents receive parking permits when paid parking is introduced, to increase their
political support. We estimate the effect of this policy on residents by examining the effect of the
introduction of paid parking on house prices for Amsterdam and Utrecht during a period of 30
years. We find no effect of this policy on house prices. This finding is consistent with the idea that
residents only vote in favour of a local policy when it has no negative impact on their house prices.
Final version: March 2018
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1.0 Introduction
Parking policies typically aim to reduce demand for street parking in order to reduce
cruising for parking. We know very little of the effect of these policies on residents
(Bakis et al., 2017). Information on this effect is particularly relevant when residents
have a strong influence on local parking policy, either as voters or informally through
lobbying. For example, the political economy literature indicates that it will be difficult
for local governments to introduce welfare-improving parking policies if residents are not
in favour of these policies (see Marcucci et al., 2005 and Button, 2006 in the context of
road pricing; De Borger and Proost, 2012; Russo, 2013).
In this paper we estimate the effect of the introduction of paid parking on house prices
for Amsterdam and Utrecht, two major cities in the Netherlands. In both cities, paid
parking and residential parking permits are introduced at the same time. These permits
allow residents to park locally for an unlimited time for a fraction of the price compared
to non-residents (Van Ommeren et al., 2011). For example, in Amsterdam the price of
an annual parking permit is about E100 and maximally E400, which compares favourably
to the non-residential parking tariffs of E5 per hour (or E40 per day). Parking permits are
licence-plate-specific and non-tradable, and allow residents to park in the same streets
where also non-residents are allowed to park.
Car ownership has strongly increased during the second half of the 20th century
(Dargay and Gately, 1999; Whelan, 2007). The increase in demand for residential parking
has led to excess demand for parking, which has resulted in wasteful cruising (Van
Ommeren et al., 2012). This is particularly so in historic city centres with urban structures
designed before the introduction of cars, where off-street parking is limited. Policy makers
around the world have reacted with different kinds of policies in order to deal with parking
scarcity (Topp, 1991; Kodransky and Hermann, 2011).
One important policy, advocated by economists, is the introduction of paid parking. In
almost all European countries (the main exception is Greece), we have seen a strong rise in
paid parking over the last 30 years. This strong rise is firmly supported by the theory that
indicates that paid parking is the preferred tool to regulate the on-street parking market
(Arnott et al., 1991; Arnott and Rowse, 1999; Anderson and De Palma, 2004; Arnott
and Inci, 2006). In contrast to alternative parking policies that restrict parking through
quantitative restrictions (such as minimum parking requirements and parking time
limits; see Manville, 2013), paid parking improves welfare when reducing cruising for
parking, because it generates government revenue (Arnott, 2006; Arnott and Rowse, 2009).
Paid parking is typically introduced in areas with excess parking demand, where severe
cruising for parking is observed by local authorities. In the Netherlands, on-street prices
in paid-parking areas are set roughly equal to commercial off-street parking prices (in
contrast to cities in many other countries, including the USA). Moreover, the number of
parking permits is constrained such that residential parking demand does not exceed
parking supply (Van Ommeren et al., 2012).1 Hence, paid parking strongly reduces parking
1In Amsterdam and Utrecht, parking permits are restricted to one per household in the city centre, but in some
suburbs two parking permits are provided per household. Because off-street parking is scarce, households
seldom have more cars than permits. For example, in Amsterdam, only 6 per cent of households with one
permit have more than one car (De Groote et al., 2016).
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demand by non-residents, resulting in minimal levels of cruising after the introduction of
paid parking.
Residents benefit from the introduction of paid parking, because it reduces cruising
costs, but they also have to pay higher prices for parking. A priori, it is not clear which
effect dominates, so in general it is unknown whether they favour paid parking. In the
Netherlands, the use of residential parking permits implies that the parking price paid by
residents is much lower than for non-residents. Nevertheless, residents still face an increase
in the price for parking for a number of reasons. First, they have to pay for the permit.
Second, and potentially more important, friends and family who visit residents have to
pay the full price for parking, leading to a potential reduction in social contacts. Third,
the number of permits per household is restricted (usually one per household). When the
demand for cars by the household exceeds the number of permits, then the household
faces the non-residential price for parking for the marginal car, which has increased.
This suggests that residents will favour the introduction of paid parking only when there
is a substantial benefit to residents in the form of a large reduction in cruising.
The introduction of paid parking will be reflected in housing prices when it strongly
affects residents. For example, Bakis et al. (2017) investigated the effect of paid parking
on house prices in Istanbul when residents do not receive parking permits, and are therefore
faced with the same price increase for parking as non-residents. They find substantial
decreases in house prices (about 10 per cent) after the introduction of paid parking. In
the context of Amsterdam and Utrecht, where residents vote for the introduction of paid
parking and receive parking permits when paid parking is introduced, the reduction in
house prices induced by paid parking must be substantially less.2
We estimate the effect of the introduction of paid parking and residential parking
permits between 1985 and 2014 on housing prices for Amsterdam and Utrecht by using
a hedonic house price analysis. In these cities, as well as other cities in the Netherlands,
paid parking was still restricted to city centres until the beginning of the 1990s. Since
then, municipalities have been allowed to extract revenues from parking. This gave both
municipalities an incentive to increase parking tariffs and to introduce paid parking
throughout the city (Van Dijken, 2002).
Importantly, in both cities, local residents play an important role in the decision
whether paid parking is introduced. In Utrecht, residential parking is locally introduced
after a (non-binding) referendum (Verkeersnet, 2013). In Amsterdam, it is the local council
that decides on the introduction of paid parking, after which the municipal government is
allowed to set the price of street parking.3
In the city centres of Amsterdam and Utrecht, parking prices were strongly increased in
the early 1990s and mid-1990s, respectively. This led to increased demand for parking in
surrounding areas, which induced residents in these areas to vote in favour of paid parking.
2For example, the price effect of a parking permit of E100 per year in Amsterdam amounts to a E2,000 annualised
value given a 5 per cent discount rate, which is less than 1 per cent of the average house price.
3It is plausible that residents that own private off-street parking spaces are less likely to vote in favour of paid
parking, because they do not benefit directly from reductions in cruising time. In both cities, private ownership
of parking is low (about 6 per cent of households in owner-occupied housing, and less in public housing).
This makes it plausible that paid parking is introduced when residents with privately owned parking are not in
favour.
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In our identification strategy, we exploit the strong expansion of paid parking over time in
different areas.4
We do not find any evidence of an effect of parking policy on housing prices. We note
that standard errors are quite small, so that the lack of statistically significant price effects
are not related to a lack of precision. This implies that it seems that residents are, on
average, indifferent to the introduction of paid parking. We will argue that this suggests
that paid parking was introduced at the right moment from the residents’ point of view.
This interpretation is in line with a political economy argument that residents will vote
for paid parking if it is beneficial to them.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the econometric framework
and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the results, followed by the sensitivity
analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.0 Econometric Framework
We aim to estimate the effect of parking policy on house prices. Houses are considered to be
bundles of attributes, such as floor space, maintenance, and location, including whether or
not there is paid parking. Using a hedonic price function, we estimate the implied price for
paid parking in a paid-parking area (Rosen, 1974; Brown and Rosen, 1982; Palmquist,
1984). In Amsterdam and Utrecht, the large majority of houses are apartments. We
focus on the price effects for apartments because of their higher floor-to-area ratio, so
apartments are more likely to be prone to an under-supply of parking. This also reduces
variation in unobserved house and street characteristics between the city centre and
other areas, which should yield more accurate results.
One statistical issue is that paid parking is more likely to occur in districts closer to the
city centre, so the introduction of paid parking is not random over space. To address this
issue, we exploit temporal variation in paid-parking area designation by including zip-code
fixed effects, so compare price changes between treated and non-treated areas. In the
Netherlands, zip-code areas encompass about half a street (on average 15 households),
which is comparable to a census block in the USA. These fixed effects essentially control
for all unobserved time-invariant spatial attributes, implying that we identify the effects
of parking policy on house prices over time (Van Ommeren and Wentink, 2012).
Furthermore, we only include areas where paid parking was introduced after 1985,
implying that we exploit differences in the timing of the implementation in paid parking.5
The induced price change may not necessarily be instantaneous. Prices may change in
anticipation of the parking policy change, or may slowly adjust to the parking policy
change after implementation. In both cases, one tends to underestimate the effect of the
introduction of paid parking in our set-up. To mitigate this issue, we exclude observations
within one year before and after the introduction of paid parking.
4Waiting lists for parking permits are common in the city centres, but paid parking was introduced in these areas
before 1985 and is excluded in our empirical analysis, as we focus on the introduction of paid parking after 1985.
5Hence, we exclude areas where paid parking was never introduced and areas where paid parking was introduced
before the period investigated.
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More specifically, let yijt be the logarithm of the price of apartment i in district j in year t.
We control for housing attributes hit, include year fixed effects ut, and control for the possi-
bility that prices have developed differently within the city centre and in the suburbs by
including a distance-year interaction effect (di × tt), where di refers to the distance to the
city centre and tt refers to the year. The preferred specification to be estimated is:
yijt = apjt + b( pjt × oit) + goit + dcit + zhit + hi + ut + (di × tt) + (bi × tt) + 1ijt,
where pjt is a dummy indicating whether district j has paid parking at time t, oit indicates
whether the apartment has a privately owned parking space, cit is a vector of private
parking characteristics such as having a garage, hi are zip-code fixed effects, and 1ijt is
an independently and identically distributed error term. Hence, a measures the impact of
a paid-parking policy, while b measures the price effects for households that own a
private parking space. The latter may be important because these households most likely
benefit from reductions in cruising time. g, d, z, hi, and ut are other parameters to be
estimated.
As apartments with private parking may have been constructed in different times and
the price developments of apartments from different times may have been different, we
also include a construction decade-year interaction effect (bi × tt).
3.0 Data
We use housing transaction data from 1985 to 2014 from the Dutch Brokers Association
(NVM), which includes over 2.5 million observations of owner-occupied houses all
across the Netherlands and provides us with detailed information about housing trans-
actions. The data set includes house prices and house characteristics, such as surface
area, construction year, and location. We use the most detailed six-digit zip code (roughly
comparable to a US census block) to identify the location of the houses. In order to reduce
heterogeneity between houses over time, we only use the five-digit zip-code areas that
existed before the year 2000, so newly built neighbourhoods with possibly different
supply of parking facilities are excluded. This leaves us with 123,260 observations for
Amsterdam and Utrecht.
We have obtained information on parking districts from both municipalities and
verified for each district the year of implementation. For Amsterdam we have 40 parking
districts, of which the average size is 139 hectares. For Utrecht we have 33 parking districts,
which are on average 27 hectares. Figure 1 shows the paid-parking districts, including when
paid parking was introduced. It can be clearly seen that paid parking was first introduced in
the city centre and later in areas around the centre.
Table 1 reports the main descriptives for the full data set, but also for the subsets of
paid-parking areas, free-parking areas, and transition areas, where paid parking was
introduced during the study period (1985–2014). The average house price is on average
E214,000. Houses are small in Amsterdam and Utrecht (82 m2 versus the Dutch average
of 117 m2). In Table 1 we also observe that paid parking areas are usually close to the
centre, as the average house price is much higher than in areas without paid parking
(E253,000 versus E132,000). Areas where paid parking is implemented during the study
period are comparable to the areas where paid parking has already been introduced.
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Private parking space is rare. In the data set only about 5 per cent of the houses have a
garage. Outdoor parking, which is a privately owned parking space without the additional
protection that a garage offers, is even less common. In the data set only about 2 per cent of
the houses have privately owned outdoor parking space. It is more common in the areas
without paid parking than in the paid-parking areas.
An important assumption in models that rely on temporal variation is that pre-trends
are similar. We have tested this first between paid-parking areas and non-paid-parking
areas (see Figure 2). The black line represents the average house price in the areas with
paid parking, while the grey line represents the average house price in the areas without
paid parking. The grey areas show the confidence intervals.
During the study period, house prices have consistently been higher in the paid-parking
areas and seem to have similar price trends. Due to the wide confidence interval it is hard to
compare the trends before the large-scale introduction of paid parking in the mid-1990s,
whereas in the late 1990s, house prices have increased more rapidly in the areas with
paid parking. This, however, does not necessarily mean there is a causal effect of paid
Figure 1
Paid-parking Districts in Amsterdam and Utrecht
Amsterdam Utrecht
Table 1
Descriptives: Amsterdam and Utrecht
Full data set Paid parking No paid parking Paid parking .1985
House price (E) 213,555 253,095 131,908 232,885
Floor space (m2) 81.7 81.9 81.3 82.0
Number of rooms 3.07 3.02 3.16 3.07
Constructed before 1945 0.589 0.723 0.313 0.731
Outdoor parking 0.021 0.016 0.032 0.017
Garage parking 0.048 0.047 0.052 0.042
Year 2005 2006 2001 2005
Number of observations 123,260 83,044 40,216 90,313
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parking on house prices. There may be other confounding factors, like different house price
trends between the city centre and the fringes. Wewill take this into account in the statistical
analysis.
In order to obtain a more meaningful comparison between the paid-parking and non-
paid-parking areas, we only analyse the areas where paid parking was introduced after
1985. This ignores the city centres and the fringes, and should therefore reduce the effect
of different price trends in different areas to some extent. Figure 3 shows the average
house prices within this constricted sample. The pattern is similar to that in Figure 2.
4.0 Results
As we have information on the location and timing of paid parking, we can estimate the
direct effect of paid parking on house prices and on the value of privately owned parking
spaces. We cluster the standard errors at the parking district level. The results are reported
in Table 2.
Column (1) relies on the full data set, including apartments in the cities of Amsterdam
and Utrecht. We find that the introduction of paid parking seems to have had a positive
effect on house prices: prices are 4 per cent higher in paid parking areas. Properties with
garage parking space are 6 per cent more expensive, while having an outdoor private
Figure 2
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parking space implies a price increase of 3 per cent. We find that private parking outdoor
spaces are almost twice as expensive in paid parking areas, which probably reflects the fact
that land has become more expensive in and close to city centres. In any case, this coefficient
is unlikely to reflect a causal effect of parking policies.
To address the issue that paid parking areas may have had different temporal trends
from free parking areas, we only include observations in parking districts in which paid
parking is introduced after 1985. This reduces the number of observations by about
25 per cent and implies that we identify the effect of parking policies based on differences
in the timing of implementation. Column (2) suggests that the direct effect of paid parking
on house prices disappears. Also, the indirect effect via a change in the price of private
parking spaces is far from being statistically significant. Private parking space is more valu-
able if we only focus on areas where paid parking was introduced during the study period.
Private parking space increases house prices by 6 per cent (outside parking) to 9 per cent
(garage parking). Interestingly, these estimations are similar or lower than those found
for US cities, which indicate that private parking space is worth between 9 and
17 per cent of the price of a house (Manville, 2013; Gabbe and Pierce, 2017), with several
studies finding 12 per cent (Litman, 1995; Jia and Wachs, 1999). This difference might be a
result of lower levels of cruising in the Netherlands, which makes private parking less valu-
able, but it may also be a result of other differences between the Netherlands and the USA.
For example, the value of private parking space may depend on car ownership levels.
Figure 3
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The coefficients of the other control variables, however, have not changed. Their signs
are as expected, with positive coefficients for size and central heating. The only unexpected
result is the negative coefficient for a garden. This coefficient, however, applies to a poorly
maintained garden. As maintenance is valued highly, a well-maintained garden increases
the value of a house.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 2, we make a distinction between Amsterdam and
Utrecht, respectively, as cities may have very different unobserved traits that may be corre-
lated to changes in parking policies. However, it is confirmed that parking policies do not
affect house prices in either Amsterdam or Utrecht. Given the 95 per cent confidence
interval, the direct price effect in Amsterdam is maximally 4.6 per cent
(0.009+ 1.96× 0.019), while the negative indirect effect on parking spaces is maximally
Table 2
House Price: Amsterdam and Utrecht (Dependent Variable: Log of House Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Paid parking .1985 Amsterdam Utrecht
Paid parking 0.039*** −0.011 0.009 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011)
Paid parking × private parking 0.026** −0.016 −0.026 −0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Outdoor parking 0.029*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.086***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Garage parking 0.060*** 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.087***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Log size 0.770*** 0.774*** 0.853*** 0.839***
(0.041) (0.062) (0.021) (0.043)
Log size × distance to city centre2 −0.005 −0.004 −0.024 −0.185***
(0.027) (0.045) (0.023) (0.044)
Log size × distance to city centre2 −0.003 0.002 0.001 −0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010)
Garden −0.033*** −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018)
Garden maintenance 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.113***
(0 = bad, 1 = good) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Central heating 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.050***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Insulation (5) yes yes yes yes
Construction year (7) yes yes yes yes
Construction year × year (7 × 30) yes yes yes yes
Distance to city centre × year (30) yes yes yes yes
Zip-code fixed effects (8,789) yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects (30) yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 123,260 90,313 78,938 11,375
R2 0.951 0.951 0.954 0.941
Notes: In columns (2)–(4) we only include districts in which paid parking is introduced during the study period.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the parking-district level. *** p , 0.01, ** p , 0.5, * p , 0.10.
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6.2 per cent (−0.026− 1.96× 0.019). For Utrecht the maximum effects are even smaller,
despite the fact that we only have a little more than 11,000 observations.
Our results imply that the house price effects of paid parking policies are unlikely to be
substantial and most likely to be absent. This result strongly differs from those obtained for
Istanbul, where residents did not receive residential parking permits and where residents
were not able to vote about the introduction of paid parking (Bakis et al., 2017). The
absence of such a negative (or positive) effect implies that the main benefit of paid parking
to residents — that is, less cruising — is offset by additional costs (for example, permit
costs, visitors that have to pay, not being able to park a second car). Such a finding is in
line with political economy arguments such as that by Russo (2013), who shows that
residents resist measures that are detrimental to them.
To make this argument more explicit in the context of our paper, let us now make the
assumption that residential cruising costs will increase over time in the absence of change in
policy. This assumption is in line with studies that show that car demand, and therefore
parking demand, increases because of increases in income (Dargay and Gately, 1999;
Whelan, 2007). Furthermore, let us assume that politicians favour the introduction of
paid parking to reduce parking demand, but the implementation depends on the residents,
who will have to vote in favour of its introduction. Arguably, when cruising costs are still
low, paid parking will not be implemented, because the reductions in cruising costs will be
small when paid parking is introduced. However, it will be implemented when residents are
indifferent between paid and free parking, resulting in the absence of any effect of paid
parking. A negative effect of paid parking would imply the absence of substantial residen-
tial cruising, indicating that paid parking was introduced too early from the residents’
standpoint, whereas a positive effect would imply severe cruising for parking prior to the
introduction of paid parking, indicating that paid parking was introduced too late from
the residents’ perspective.
5.0 Sensitivity Analysis
We shall now perform a battery of sensitivity analyses, which are reported in Table 3. In
columns (1) to (3), we focus on Amsterdam, and in columns (4) to (6) we pay attention
to Utrecht.
In column (1) we include not only apartments, but all other housing types (terraced,
semi-detached, and detached properties). As most houses are apartments, this increases
the number of observations by only about 5 per cent and leaves the results unaffected. In
column (2) we try to further aim to address the issue of unobserved trends that are corre-
lated to the introduction of paid parking by including a squared interaction term of
distance to the city centre and transaction year. Again we do not find any effect. In
column (3) we make a distinction between the effect of paid parking on the value of private
outside and garage parking spaces. Both coefficients are statistically insignificant, but inter-
estingly, only the garage parking coefficient is negative for both Amsterdam and Utrecht
(column (6)). Hence, paid parking may have had some negative effects on the value of
garage parking. However, the standard errors are again too large to make precise state-
ments. We repeat the same set of specifications for Utrecht in columns (4)–(6), confirming
the absence of a statistically significant effect of parking policy on house prices.
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Throughout the analysis we assume that the value of parking space relative to the house
has remained constant over time. We have tested if the value of private parking has changed
over time in the Netherlands. Figure A1, in the Appendix, shows that the garage coefficient
has remained roughly constant over time, and that there is no difference between cities with
and without paid parking. For a more detailed discussion on the relative value of parking
space over time, we refer to the Appendix.
6.0 Conclusion
In our analysis we have estimated changes in house prices as a result of changes in parking
policy — that is, the introduction of paid parking and the introduction of residential
parking permits in two large Dutch cities for a period of about 30 years. The most impor-
tant result from the analysis is that there is no statistically significant effect of parking policy
on house prices. We find neither a direct effect nor an effect via the willingness to pay for a
private parking space. This strongly suggests that paid parking has been introduced at
about the moment where residents are indifferent about the introduction of paid parking.
This finding is in line with political economy arguments (Russo, 2013), which show that
residents resist measures that are detrimental to them.
The influence of the introduction of paid parking on house prices of residences with
private parking space is less clear, but most likely there is no effect. Some findings suggest
that the economic value of privately owned parking is reduced when paid parking is
introduced.
Can we say anything about the welfare effects of the introduction of paid parking? The
absence of any negative effect on local residents strongly signals a positive welfare effect of
this policy, as the introduction of paid parking for non-residents likely has improved the
efficiency of this market. However, for a more elaborate welfare analysis, one should also
consider the welfare effects on visitors and commercial activities such as retail. We leave
this for further research.
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Appendix: Private Parking Space in the Netherlands
It may be insightful to see if the implementation of paid parking is correlated with changes
in the relative value of private parking spaces. Based on reported parking revenues, we can
distinguish between municipalities with and without paid parking. In 2009, about
36 per cent of the Dutch municipalities had paid parking. As paid parking is more
common in the larger municipalities, 64 per cent of the observations, or about 1.5 million
observations, are within a city with paid parking. We can derive whether or not the relative
value of private parking space has increased (for example, due to increased car ownership)
or decreased over time, and whether this development has been different between munici-
palities with and without paid parking. The analysis suggests that garage parking space is
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rather consistently more valuable in municipalities without paid parking, but that the
difference is only about 1 per cent of the total house price.
The main analysis assumes that the relative value of a parking space has remained
constant over time. The relative value of a parking space may, however, have changed
over time unrelated to parking policy. Therefore, we have also estimated a model using
Table A1
Descriptives: the Netherlands





House price (E) 194,881 162,330 232,596 191.342
Floor space (m2) 117.3 86.0 105.1 92.7
Number of rooms 4.35 3.22 3.24 3.05
Apartment 0.27 1.00 1.00 1.00
Constructed before 1945 0.26 0.28 0.05 0.05
Year 2003.2 2004.4 2004.8 2005.1
Number of observations 2,409,379 653,455 66,758 40,995
Table A2
Value of a Privately Owned Parking Spot (Dependent Variable: Log of House Price)
1990–4 1995–9 2000–4 2005–9 2010–14
Outdoor parking 0.005 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.048***
(paid parking) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Outdoor parking 0.022 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.041***
(no paid parking) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Garage parking 0.088*** 0.120*** 0.097*** 0.084*** 0.079***
(paid parking) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Garage parking 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.083*** 0.091***
(no paid parking) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Floor space (log) 0.667*** 0.577*** 0.611*** 0.647*** 0.701***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Garden 0.020 −0.009 −0.016** −0.035*** −0.036***
(0.026) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Garden maintenance 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.126***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Central heating 0.050*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 0.045*** 0.042***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Insulation (5) yes yes yes yes yes
Construction year (7) yes yes yes yes yes
Zip-code × year fixed effects (8,789) yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 24,295 105,575 176,667 194,774 142,754
R2 0.914 0.844 0.899 0.922 0.919
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the parking-district level. The asterisks indicate the
10 per cent (*), 5 per cent (**), and 1 per cent (***) significance levels. All specifications include year and zip-
code fixed effects, and year-distance to city centre interaction effects. Apartments constructed before 1945 are
the reference categories.
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data on the whole of the Netherlands. We distinguish between cities with and without paid
parking, so we can compare the development of the relative value of parking space between
cities with and without paid parking. We have estimated this model separately for every
year, so we can track the coefficients related to private parking spaces over time. In
short, the model looks as follows:
yijt = btcit + gthit + hit + 1ijt.
So the coefficients are year-specific. As we estimate the coefficients per year, we do not need
year dummies or year interaction effects. As we estimate the zip-code fixed effects hit per
year, we also control for very local differences in house-price developments.
We report the descriptive statistics for the full sample in Table A1. Average house prices
have increased fromE64,000 in 1985 to nearlyE200,000 in 2008. In the data set, 10 per cent
of the apartments possessed a private garage parking spot and another 6 per cent possessed
an outdoor parking spot. Apartments with garage parking were generally larger and more
expensive. Interestingly, apartments with a garage are generally more expensive than apart-
ments without. This may indicate that garages have a non-negligible influence on house
prices, but it may also be due to other characteristics, such as floor space, that are correlated
with owning a garage.
We estimate the annual private-parking coefficient municipalities with and without paid
parking. Table A2 shows the coefficients of the control variables at five-year intervals. The
coefficients of the control variables do change a bit over time, which suggests that apart-
ment characteristics are valued differently over different time periods. Interestingly, the
coefficient of floor space has changed considerably over time. The coefficient was relatively
low in the mid-1990s, but higher in the late 2000s.
Figure A1
























Paid parking No paid parking
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As expected, garage parking is valued higher than outdoor parking. On average, garage
parking space increases the value of a house by about 10 per cent (see also Figure A1, which
shows the per-year garage coefficient), while outdoor parking space increases house prices
by 4 per cent. Interestingly, the relative value does not differ much between cities with and
without paid parking (the per-year private parking space coefficients (not shown) are also
very similar in municipalities with and without paid parking). The year-to-year changes are
substantial, but the patterns are very similar. The relative value of garage parking space
peaked in around 2000, and has decreased afterwards. Hence, the absence of an effect of
parking policies on house prices is unlikely to be explained by time-varying preferences
for private parking spaces.
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